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Dibadj: (Mis)Conceptions of the Corporation

(MIS)CONCEPTIONS OF THE CORPORATION
Reza Dibadj*
ABSTRACT
Common conceptions of the corporation are wrong. Contrary to
contemporary jurisprudence, a corporation—a piece of paper that is
given legal legitimacy by a state—is not a person worthy of
constitutional rights. A corporation, as a legislative creature, should
only enjoy those rights bestowed upon it by its creator.
This Article is structured into three principal sections. Part I argues
that the only appropriate theoretical construct with which to
conceptualize a corporation is one that posits that the corporation is
an artificial creation of the state. First, it outlines three competing
theories—artificial, associational, and real entity—as well as the
apparently increasingly popular notion that theory simply does not
matter. It argues that as Supreme Court precedent evolved, it became
sadly muddled and that today the Court has essentially given up on
theorizing the corporation. Second, it argues for the artificial entity
theory on the bases of common sense, constitutional history, and the
continuing role of the state in chartering corporations.
Why has the artificial entity theory fallen deeply out of favor? Part
II, which explores the political economy of corporate theory, argues
that instrumental reasons explain the decline of artificial entity
theory: anti-regulatory fervor and a desire to privilege a managerial
class. Next, it addresses some concerns that might emerge to my
conceptualization; notably, that not offering constitutional rights to
corporations is too stark and reductionist an approach, as well as the
notion that such a restrictive conception of corporate personhood
might jeopardize attempts to find corporations liable under criminal
or international law.
Finally, Part III discusses whether the law has been headed in
precisely the wrong direction: rather than asking whether
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco.
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corporations deserve constitutional rights, should the real question be
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The emperor marched in the procession under the beautiful
canopy, and all who saw him in the street and out of the
windows exclaimed: “Indeed, the emperor’s new suit is
incomparable! What a long train he has! How well it fits him!”
Nobody wished to let others know he saw nothing, for then he
would have been unfit for his office or too stupid. Never
emperor’s clothes were more admired. “But he has nothing on at
1
all,” said a little child at last.

INTRODUCTION
Common conceptions of the corporation are wrong. Contrary to
contemporary jurisprudence, a corporation—a piece of paper that is
given legal legitimacy by a state—is not a person worthy of
constitutional rights. On the one hand, this argument may appear so
banal that it seems absurd to devote an entire law review article to it;
on the other, no matter how simple and intuitive this point of view
might be, I am fighting a discouraging uphill battle. The opposing
point of view—namely, that corporations are worthy of constitutional
protection—is so entrenched that all I can do is expose its fallacies
and offer a small hope for future reform.
In an area of law that has become unnecessarily muddled, I argue
for simplicity and intellectual consistency.2 My thesis is simple: a
corporation, as a legislative creature, should only enjoy those rights
bestowed upon it by its creator.
The argument is structured into three principal sections. Part I
argues that the only appropriate theoretical construct for
conceptualizing a corporation is one that posits that the corporation is
an artificial creation of the state.3 First, it outlines three competing
theories—artificial, associational, and real entity—as well as the
1. Hans Christian Andersen, The Emperor’s New Suit, HCA.GILEAD.ORG.IL (Dec. 13, 2007, 8:45
PM), http://hca.gilead.org.il/emperor.html.
2. Cf. Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2001) [hereinafter Legal Fiction] (lamenting “the theoretical unmooring
and doctrinal disarray of the American law of persons”).
3. See discussion infra Part I.

Published by Reading Room, 2013

3

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

734

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:3

apparently increasingly popular notion that theory simply does not
matter.4 It argues that as Supreme Court precedent evolved, it became
sadly muddled and that today the Court has essentially given up on
theorizing the corporation.5 Second, it argues for the artificial entity
theory on the bases of common sense, constitutional history, and the
continuing role of the state in chartering corporations.6
Part II delves into the political economy of corporate theory. If, as
Part I argues, the artificial theory makes so much sense, then why has
it fallen deeply out of favor? Part II argues that instrumental reasons
explain the decline of artificial entity theory: anti-regulatory fervor
and a desire to privilege a managerial class. Next, I address some
concerns that might emerge from my conceptualization: notably, that
not offering constitutional rights to corporations is too stark and
reductionist an approach as well as the notion that such a restrictive
conception of corporate personhood might jeopardize attempts to find
corporations liable under criminal or international law.7 Finally, Part
III addresses whether the law has been headed in precisely the wrong
direction: rather than asking whether corporations deserve
constitutional rights, should the real question be whether
constitutional rights should be asserted against corporations?8
One point cannot be overemphasized before beginning: my
argument is not that either corporations or corporate insiders are
somehow inherently bad; it is merely that recent constitutional
jurisprudence has given too much power to corporations and those
who run them in a way that might be detrimental to the broader
interests of society.9

4. See discussion infra Part I.
5. See discussion infra Part I.
6. See discussion infra Part I.
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. See discussion infra Part III.
9. Cf. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
129 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 1937) (1776) (“The pretence that corporations are
necessary for the better government of the trade, is without any foundation.”).
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I. TOWARD A THEORY OF THE CORPORATION
CORPORATE ENTITY
The Oklahoma Ligno and Lithograph Co
Of Maine doing business in Delaware Tennessee
Missouri Montana Ohio and Idaho
With a corporate existence distinct from that of the
Secretary Treasurer President Directors or
Majority stockholder being empowered to acquire
As principal agent trustee licensee licensor
Any or all in part or in parts or entire
Etchings impressions engravings engravures prints
Paintings oil-paintings canvases portraits vignettes
Tableaux ceramics relievos insculptures tints
Art-treasures or masterpieces complete or in sets
The Oklahoma Ligno and Lithograph Co
Weeps at a nude by Michael Angelo.
10
— Archibald MacLeish

There are three competing conceptions of the corporation: the
artificial entity theory, the associational theory, and the real entity
theory. Additionally, there is the view that theory does not matter.
First, I outline each of these four perspectives and highlight examples
from Supreme Court jurisprudence. Next, I argue—contrary to
current
conventional
wisdom—that
the
only
coherent
conceptualization of the corporation is the artificial entity theory.
A. Competing Conceptions
The original theory of the corporation was the artificial entity
theory where the corporation is “regarded as an ‘artificial being’
created by the state with powers strictly limited by its charter of
incorporation.”11 Most importantly for our purposes, “[u]nder this
10. Archibald MacLeish, Apologia, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1507 (1972).
11. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L.
REV. 173, 181 (1985); see also id. at 184 (“The traditional conception, derived from the ante-bellum
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view, corporations cannot assert constitutional rights against the
state, their creator.”12 Courts have occasionally used this theory13 in
older cases, but it is currently out of vogue.14 For instance, in Bank of
Augusta, the Supreme Court relied on the theory to deny corporations
citizenship under the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.15
The second theory sees the corporation as an aggregate or
association of the shareholders comprising it.16 Through this
metaphor, rights that individuals qua individuals might have are
magically transferred to the corporation:17 to the extent the aggregate
theory emphasizes shareholders and not the state it provides a
conceptual framework with which to oppose governmental
regulation.18
grant theory, as well as older English corporation law, characterized the corporation as ‘an artificial
entity created by positive law.’”).
12. Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 577, 580 (1990); see also Daniel Lipton, Note, Corporate Capacity for Crime and Politics:
Defining Corporate Personhood at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 96 VA. L. REV. 1911, 1915
(2010) (“Artificial entity theory viewed the corporation as nothing more than a creature of the law,
whose rights consisted only of those conferred by the state.”); Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a
General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic
Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1455 (1992) (“The artificial entity theory holds that the
corporation is a creature of state law, and that the state may deny liberty rights to its legal creation.”).
13. See Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1752 (“In some cases, courts have emphasized the artificiality
of corporations, holding that rights that inhere in humans as humans may not be extended to nonhuman
entities; the assumption that legal personhood derives primarily from humanness has clearly animated
this approach.”).
14. The classic and oft-quoted articulation of artificial entity theory derives from Justice Marshall’s
famous opinion in Dartmouth College where he stated that a corporation “is an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, . . . possess[ing] only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.” Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
15. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586–88 (1839).
16. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629,
1641 (2011) (“[T]he ‘aggregate’ theory, looked through the corporate form to the individuals behind it.
This view regarded the corporation as a collection of its individual members, the shareholders.”);
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, To Be or Not to Be? Citizens United and the Corporate Form 1 (Univ. of Mich.
Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 184, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546087 (commenting on “the aggregate theory, which views the corporation
as an aggregate of its members or shareholders”).
17. See Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1753 (“Alternatively, courts have emphasized the human
individuals that constitute the corporation, deploying the corporate personhood metaphor as a means of
protecting those individuals’ rights.”); Rivard, supra note 12, at 1455–56 (“The aggregate entity theory
holds that natural persons within the corporation justify granting liberty rights to a corporation, to
protect the rights of natural persons within it.”).
18. See David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood 4 (Washington & Lee
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 01-6, 2001), available at
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Two interesting points are worth noting with regard to the
aggregate theory. First, the corporate lawyers espousing this theory
did so by claiming an analogy to partnership and contract.19 As
Morton Horwitz notes, “[i]n reaction to the grant [artificial entity]
theory, some legal writers during the 1880s began to put forth a polar
opposite conception of the corporation as a creature of free contract
among individual shareholders, no different, in effect, from a
partnership.”20 While early theorists emphasized the partnership
analogy, the more recent focus—as epitomized by modern
contractualists—is to argue that corporations are merely “a set of
contracts created through private ordering that should be protected
from government interference.”21 As leading contractual theorist
Larry
Ribstein
puts
it,
“[t]he
corporate
contract
theory . . . characterizes corporations like any other contracts. Under
this theory, any government regulation that constrains the exercise of
constitutional rights would have to be justified to the same extent as
it would with respect to other types of contracts.”22

http://ssrn.com/abstract=264141 (“Opponents of governmental regulation of the corporation relied on
the aggregate characterization. . . . The aggregate theory challenged the older notion that the corporation
was an entity or person created by the state.”).
19. In the words of one commentator:
Faced with public hostility towards large business and a crippled legal conception of
the corporate form, some members of the corporate bar put forward a modification of the
fictive person formula of the corporation during the 1880s. These attorneys hoped to
expand the rights of corporations while preserving their structural organization by
suggesting that the proper way to think of corporations was that they were similar to
partnerships.
Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1457 (1987).
20. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 184; see also Pollman, supra note 16, at 1641 (“The [aggregate]
theory had roots in a view of the corporation as a partnership or contract among the shareholders.”).
21. Pollman, supra note 16, at 1666; see also id. at 1667 (“[T]he contract view has been
characterized as simply a reinvention of the aggregate theory representing the opposite pole in a debate
with the classic concession theory.”); Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical
Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 83 (2005)
(“[I]ndividualists advocated a contractual theory, which built on and refined the aggregate entity
theory.”).
22. Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95,
109 (1995).
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Second, the original emphasis of the associational theory was on
protecting the property rights of shareholders.23 As Herbert
Hovenkamp observes in his analysis of Santa Clara:
The constitutional doctrine of “personhood” was the Supreme
Court’s solution to two problems. The first problem was
guaranteeing that the owners of property held in the name of a
corporation would receive the same constitutional protections as
the owners of property held in their own name. The second
problem, which lies below the surface, was how to assign the
power to assert constitutional rights in corporately held
24
property.

In sum, the idea is that since the property interests of the corporation
can be traced back to the shareholders, the corporation should be able
to assert those rights.25 This traceability rationale has been extended
and applied, most notably and controversially, to speech; in other
words, the corporation’s right to speak is justified based on the fact
that the corporation represents an association of individuals.26
23. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 19, at 1458 (“Having grounded the protection of corporate property
in the rights of the shareholders, the treatise writers also moved to establish the legitimacy of the
corporate structure on non-legal foundations.”).
24. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593,
1641 (1988); see also id. at 1643 (“The best explanation of Santa Clara is that by 1886 both state and
federal courts agreed that, in most cases, the corporation, rather than its shareholders, must be the named
party to the corporation’s litigation.”). Cf. Millon, supra note 18, at 17 (“The property rights argument,
which had its roots in old ideas about the ownership of business organizations, therefore supported the
view that shareholders, among all the constituencies interested in a corporation’s behavior, should hold a
place of primacy.”).
25. As Hovenkamp describes it:
The Court might have chosen another route for giving what little fourteenth
amendment protection existed to private property owned by corporations. It might have
said that the corporation represents the constitutional property rights of its shareholders.
But that would have left the Court in a quagmire concerning one person’s right to assert
the constitutional claims of another. Worse, it might have opened the door to shareholder
participation in constitutional litigation involving the corporation, since the shareholders’
rights were at stake.
Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 1643.
26. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, No Middle Ground? Reflections on the Citizens United Decision,
96 IOWA L. REV. 649, 663 (2011) (“The central distinction is between collective speech that can be
traced to individuals’ intentions and that which cannot, between speech protected as function of the
individual speaker’s liberty and speech that cannot be justified in the name of liberty.”); Charles R.
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Most crucially, careful scholars suggest that the associational
theory—undergirded by property rights—explains the stunningly
sweeping grant of constitutional rights bestowed upon corporations in
the headnote of the Supreme Court’s 1886 Santa Clara opinion,
which asserted that “The court does not wish to hear argument on the
question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution . . . applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion
that it does.”27 To be sure, the headnote is deeply troubling in simply
concluding, without any analysis whatever, that corporations should
be granted protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.28 Thus,
Santa Clara has been quite powerfully and correctly criticized.29 As
Morton Horwitz’s careful historical analysis suggests, however, the
Court’s conclusory statement was most likely predicated on the
associational theory—more specifically, protecting the property
rights of the corporation’s constituent shareholders:
In Santa Clara a “natural entity” theory was unnecessary for
the immediate task of constitutionalizing corporate property
rights. An “aggregate” or “partnership” or “contractual”
vision of the corporation . . . was sufficient to focus the
O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and
the Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1366 (1979) (“Under the
associational rationale, however, when individuals with a desire to express their common views exercise
their freedom of expression through the medium of a corporation and its agents, the corporation may
assert that the expression is protected under the first amendment.”).
27. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
28. See, e.g., Krannich, supra note 21, at 78 (“Santa Clara may be viewed as the watershed case for
corporate constitutional rights, for by holding that a corporation is a constitutional ‘person’ under the
Fourteenth Amendment, it provided the foundation for all corporate constitutional rights.”).
29. As Charles Reich laments:
In 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court made a major and radical change in the nation’s
charter. The Court held that corporations were “persons” entitled to certain of the rights
and protections given to individuals by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This
decision, which was reached by a Court that did not even hear argument on the issue and
cited no basis for its “interpretation,” was revolutionary . . . .
CHARLES A. REICH, OPPOSING THE SYSTEM 142 (1995) (citation omitted); see also First Nat’l Bank of
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“This Court decided at an early
date, with neither argument nor discussion, that a business corporation is a ‘person’ entitled to the
protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citing Santa Clara, 118 U.S.
at 409)); Krannich, supra note 21, at 93 (“This lack of reasoning and analysis is troubling given that
Santa Clara has proven to be a fountainhead for all other corporate constitutional rights. This suggests a
foundational issue for later adjudications of corporate personhood.”).
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conceptual emphasis on the property rights of shareholders.
Either a partnership or natural entity view could equally
successfully have subverted the dominant “artificial entity” view
30
of the corporation as a creature of the state.

Similarly, Herbert Hovenkamp suggests that “[a]t bottom, the
corporate personhood doctrine of Santa Clara represented an
efficient way for the corporation to assert the property rights of its
shareholders.”31 Some observers suggest that the headnote was
essentially taken from Justice Field’s opinion in The Railroad Tax
Cases, which espoused an associational theory of the corporation
with an ostensible focus on property rights.32 There, Justice Field
asserted that corporations “have never been considered citizens for
any other purpose than the protection of the property rights of the
corporators.”33 By contrast, the “prohibition against the deprivation
of life and liberty in the . . . [F]ifth [A]mendment does not apply to
corporations, because . . . the lives and liberties of the individual
corporators are not the life and liberty of the corporation.”34
30. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 223 (emphasis added); see also Lipton, supra note 12, at 1942 (“So,
when Justice Morrison Waite declared in one short paragraph in Santa Clara County that the Justices
would not entertain the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment afforded protections to
corporations as persons, he was relying upon the established proposition that corporate property was to
be treated no differently than individual property.”).
31. Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 1649. Cf. Lipton, supra note 12, at 1935 (“The courts viewed
corporate personhood as an extension of property interests.”); Mark, supra note 19, at 1464 (“Because
court reporters, even Supreme Court reporters, are not sources of doctrine, it is impossible to assume
that the court meant to do anything more than accept the argument that corporate property was protected
as property of the corporators, no matter what uses the Court’s announcement was put to in later
cases.”).
32. See Cnty. of San Mateo v S. Pac. R. Co. (The Railroad Tax Cases), 13 F. 722, 744 (Field, Circuit
Justice, C.C.D. Cal 1882) (“It would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision intended for
the protection of every person against partial and discriminating legislation by the states, should cease to
exert such protection the moment the person becomes a member of a corporation. . . . [W]henever a
provision of the constitution, or of a law, guaranties to persons the enjoyment of property, or affords to
them means for its protection . . . the benefits of the provision extend to corporations . . . .”). Cf. Mark,
supra note 19, at 1463 (“The evidence suggests that Conkling [the lawyer representing the railroads] and
Justice Field, the likeliest sources for a new vision of the corporation in Santa Clara, could not have had
in mind anything but the partnership analogy that they had espoused in The Railroad Tax Cases.”).
33. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. at 747; see also O’Kelley, supra note 26, at 1362 (“If a
constitutional right to protect property or business would be available to a natural person, then, under the
Field rationale, the Court has consistently held that the right is equally available to a corporation for the
protection of its property.”).
34. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. at 747.
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Subsequent Supreme Court cases revealed ambivalence in
vacillating between the associational and artificial entity theory. For
instance, two years after Santa Clara, in Pembina, the Court relied on
the artificial entity theory in refusing to recognize corporations as
“citizens” under the Privileges and Immunities Clause35—yet it relied
on the associational theory to grant corporations Equal Protection and
Due Process rights.36 Similarly, in the 1906 case of Hale v. Henkel,
the Court used the artificial entity theory to hold that corporations do
not enjoy rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment,37 while using the associational theory to give
corporations protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
under the Fourth Amendment.38 Though no longer prominent in
constitutional discourse, the associational theory occasionally
reappears in newer cases when granting corporations constitutional
rights. Perhaps most notably, the majority in Citizens United
conceptualizes corporations as “associations of citizens,”39 as does
Justice Scalia in his concurrence.40
The third theory, as audacious as it is oddly popular, is to treat the
corporation as a real entity. As strange as it might appear, this theory
“posited that the corporation was a naturally occurring being,
independent of the law and separate from its individual shareholders.
The corporation, according to this theory, possessed both free will
35. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 187 (1888) (“Nor
does the clause of the constitution declaring that the ‘citizens of each state shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states’ have any bearing upon the question of the
validity of the license tax in question. Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of that clause.”).
36. Id. at 189 (“Under the designation of ‘person’ there is no doubt that a private corporation is
included. Such corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose, and
permitted to do business under a particular name, and have a succession of members without
dissolution.”).
37. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) (“[T]he corporation is a creature of the
state . . . presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public.”).
38. Id. at 76 (“[a] corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name
and with a distinct legal entity”).
39. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, ___, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010); see
also id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (“If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from
fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech.”).
40. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set
forth the rights of individual men and women—not, for example, of trees or polar bears. But the
individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual
persons.”).
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and morality and could claim and assert rights, as would a natural
person.” 41 An anthropomorphized corporation, in turn, becomes an
entity increasingly worthy of legal protection.42
The natural entity theory emerged in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.43 While some scholars suggest that the Supreme
Court used the natural entity theory as early as 1886 in Santa Clara,44
its first clear articulation was arguably in the 1910 case Southern
Railway v. Greene.45 At one level, one can correctly note that this
historical period coincided with the advent of general incorporation
statutes, which conveniently deemphasized the role of the state.46 But
the underlying story is driven by the separation of ownership and
control. As David Millon suggests:
41. Lipton, supra note 12, at 1915; see also Pollman, supra note 16, at 1641–42 (“Also known as the
natural entity or person theory, this view regarded the corporation as a real entity with a separate
existence from its shareholders and from the state.”); Rivard, supra note 12, at 1461 (“[T]he real entity
theory holds that the corporation is like a ‘natural person.’”).
42. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 12, at 581 (“The ‘artificial entity’ theory was invoked to deny
corporations constitutional protection; the ‘natural entity’ theory was used to accord them safeguards.”);
Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1753–54 (“This [natural entity] theory provides the most robust version
of corporate personhood, and courts invoke it when attempting to extend to corporations the full panoply
of legal rights. Though it requires a rather extreme anthropomorphization of corporations, this approach
has found increasing favor with courts.”).
43. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 11, at 185 (“A third theory which emerged during the 1890s also
sought to represent the corporation as private, yet neither as ‘artificial,’ ‘fictional,’ nor as a creature of
the state.”). For an early defense of the natural entity theory, see Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate
Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253 (1911).
44. See Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243, 1257 (1999)
(“The Waite Court more or less formally adopted the natural entity view of the corporation in Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad in 1886.”). But see Horwitz, supra note 11, at 223 (“The
Santa Clara case did not represent the triumph of a ‘natural entity’ theory of the corporation.”).
45. 216 U.S. 400 (1910). As one commentator suggests:
The Court quoted Pembina for the proposition that a corporation is a “person,” but
omitted the portion of the Pembina opinion stating that corporations were “merely
associations of individuals.” By doing so, the Court implicitly adopted the emerging
theory of the corporate entity as a real person, entitled to the same rights as individuals.
Krannich, supra note 21, at 94.
46. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 10 (noting that with the move to general incorporation
statutes, “the artificial entity theory, under which the corporation derives its powers from the state, lost
most of its appeal, since the state was only vestigially involved in creating corporations. Instead,
corporations were viewed as separate from both their shareholders and the state, and the real entity view
reigned supreme”). With general incorporation statutes, incorporation no longer required a special act of
the legislature. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 19, at 1453 (“In a remarkable innovation in political
economy, the Jacksonians sought to foster legislative purity as well as restore equality when they
demanded and ultimately won universal access to the corporate form, with restrictions on the power of
the legislature to grant special perquisites.”).
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Growth in enterprise size required capital accumulation, which,
in turn, meant increasingly wide dispersal of share ownership
and relatively small individual holdings. This development also
called for new managerial expertise and a professional class of
corporate managers emerged to meet that need. In this process,
shareholders saw their status transformed from active
entrepreneurs to passive investors whose fortunes depended on
47
the efforts of others.

Crucially, as Millon points out, “if . . . the corporation was a separate
entity in its own right, rather than merely an aggregation of people, a
new governance structure and limited liability for the owners could
replace old doctrines of partnership law that stood in the way of
capital formation and professional management.”48 Unlike the
aggregate theory, which revolves around shareholders, the real entity
theory effectively deemphasizes these principals to the benefit of
management.49
While the real entity theory may legitimate managerial capitalism,
it also represents a historical change50 that is theoretically
troublesome.51 It even treats us to oxymoronic rhetoric that appears
absurd: as if by magic, an artificial entity becomes “real.”52
Corporations even have human feelings. For example, in granting
47. Millon, supra note 18, at 8.
48. Id. at 6. Cf. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 185 (“The ‘aggregate’ or contractual view of the
corporation seemed capable of restricting corporate privileges and, in particular, the rule of limited
liability.”).
49. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 19, at 1472 (“The reality of the corporation apart from its members
was becoming clearer as the relationship of the shareholders to the operations of the business became
increasingly distant.”); Rivard, supra note 12, at 1460 (“In addition to separation from the state, a
corporation under the real entity theory is an entity separate from the shareholders composing it.”); AviYonah, supra note 16, at 16 (noting the “real entity view, which equates the corporation with its
management . . . rejected the aggregate view of the corporation as an aggregate of its shareholders”).
50. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 18, at 3 (“Although the concept is generally accepted today, 150
years ago it was by no means clear that the corporation should be thought of as a distinct legal person.”).
51. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 19, at 1443 (“The concept of the personified corporation resulted
from a crisis of legal imagination that accompanied the maturation of America’s economy at the end of
the nineteenth century and largely preceded the country’s entry into what economic historians call the
second industrial revolution.”).
52. See id. at 1471 (“Even the clarifying adjective ‘real’ helped but little, for something artificial
could be real.”).
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double jeopardy protection to corporations, the Supreme Court was
worried about “embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty.”53 Or, in extending Fourth Amendment protections, the Court
tells us that a corporation “plainly has a reasonable, legitimate, and
objective expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered
buildings, and it is equally clear that expectation is one society is
prepared to observe.”54 In a remarkable metaphysical feat, a piece of
paper labeled a corporation can, inter alia, be anxious and insecure
while expecting privacy.55
As one commentator sums up:
Personification with its roots in historic theological disputes
and modern business necessity, had proved to be a potent symbol
to legitimate the autonomous business corporation and its
management. Private property rights had been transferred to
associations, associations had themselves become politically
legitimate, and the combination had helped foster modern
political economy. The corporation, once the derivative tool of
the state, had become its rival, and the successes of autonomous
corporate management turned the basis for belief in an
individualist conception of property on its head. The protests of
modern legists notwithstanding, the business corporation had
56
become the quintessential economic man.

Ascribing personhood to a corporation is easy; the problem, as I will
argue below, is that none of the theories used to justify this heroic
grant make sense.

53. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977).
54. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986).
55. Cf. Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on
Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1599 (2006) (“Because corporations are artificial entities,
it is difficult to identify a source of their moral obligations.”).
56. Mark, supra note 19, at 1482–83.
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The last theory—or, perhaps more aptly, “non-theory”—is that a
corporation theory does not matter. Perhaps the canonical text in this
tradition is John Dewey’s famous article, written in 1926, where he
argued that:
As far as the historical survey implies a plea for anything, it is a
plea for disengaging specific issues and disputes which arise
from entanglement with any concept of personality which is
other than a restatement that such and such rights and duties,
benefits and burdens, accrue and are to be maintained and
distributed in such and such ways, and in such and such
57
situations.

As one commentator observes, after “Dewey’s stunning eulogy”58
and by the 1940s:
the place of the corporation in law had ceased to be
controversial, and both theoreticians and practitioners concerned
themselves instead with organizational theory and economic
analysis of corporate behavior. The corporation as a legal
institution ceased to be of interest. The historical and
jurisprudential debates which had consumed the energies of
some of the leading legal scholars were relegated to the
introductory pages of corporation law textbooks, if they were
discussed at all. As a result, a modern lawyer knows only that a
corporation is considered a legal person but finds that
59
terminology devoid of content.

57. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 669;
see also id. at 673 (claiming that one must “enforce the value of eliminating the idea of personality until
the concrete facts and relations involved have been faced and stated on their own account”).
58. Mark, supra note 19, at 1480.
59. Id. at 1441 (emphasis added); see also Horwitz, supra note 11, at 175 (“There are very few
discussions of corporate personality after Dewey. The Legal Realists in general had succeeded in
persuading legal thinkers that highly abstract and general legal conceptions were simply part of what
Felix Cohen, quoting von Jhering, derisively called ‘the heaven of legal concepts.’”); Pollman, supra
note 16, at 1652 (“After this debate quieted, most corporate law scholars simply accepted corporate
personhood as a given, without pushing for a particular philosophical conception of the corporation to
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Most crucially for our purposes, it seems that the Supreme Court—
whether intentionally or not—has bought into Dewey’s claim and, to
a large extent, stopped trying to offer a coherent theory of the
corporation.60
Nowhere is this sad reality more present than in the context of the
First Amendment. Stated plainly, perhaps the most powerful
rhetorical move the Court has made in justifying ever-increasing free
speech rights for corporations has been to deflect attention away from
the source of the speech and instead speak of speech in abstract
generalities. For instance, the majority in Bellotti claims that “[t]he
inherent worth of the speech . . . does not depend upon the identity of
its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”61
Similarly, the Citizens United opinion asserts that “[t]he Court has
thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or
other associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural
persons.’”62
As an instrumental move to grant corporations greater rights,
deflecting attention away from any conceptualization of the speaker
is brilliant. As Adam Winkler notes, for example, with respect to
Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Bellotti: “[b]y . . . ignoring the
corporate identity of the speaker, Powell rendered the corporate
entity invisible while at the same time formalizing its equal rights.”63
ground this concept.”).
60. See Pollman, supra note 16, at 1647 (“Despite robust debate of corporate personality from the
turn of the century to the 1930s, as well as dissenting calls for reexamination of the doctrine, the Court
has not grounded the expansions of corporate rights in a coherent concept of corporate personhood nor
used a consistent approach in determining the scope of corporate rights.”).
61. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978); see also id. at 784 (“We thus find
no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, for the proposition
that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection
simply because its source is a corporation that cannot prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material
effect on its business or property.”).
62. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 900.
63. Winkler, supra note 44, at 1259; see also Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
133, 196 (1998) (“The Court’s finding that unlimited corporate initiative speech served hearers’ rights
rested on no articulated understanding of corporations as institutions.”). Cf. Mayer, supra note 12, at 633
(“In both the political speech and the commercial speech context the question became not whether the
party asserting the right (a corporation) was entitled to free speech protections, but whether assertion of
the right furthered free and open debate.”); Saul Zipkin, The Election Period and Regulation of the
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But it defies logic and constitutional history. It might be banal to note
that “[a]rtificial legal entities do not assemble to protest, to hold
signs, to sing songs, etc., though the few who rule them may hire
people to do these things. They don’t speak or write either, though
they may hire people to do these things for them.”64 There is also a
line-drawing problem: if speech is speech regardless of source, and
voting is a form of speech, then why should corporations not be
given a right to vote?65
More generally, as Randall Bezanson notes, “[w]ithout a speaker
an anchor of the First Amendment is missing.”66 He continues:
In the late eighteenth century the idea of speech without a
speaker was unthinkable. The question, “Who is the speaker?”
was redundant. Speech and speaking, as I have used the terms,
were largely, if not exclusively, synonymous. Except for
government, there were few large institutions divorced from the
personality and will of a single individual. The only exception
67
was the press.

He further argues:
It is therefore clear that those who drafted the First
Amendment could have had nothing remotely approximating the
institutional and representational speaker of today in mind. But I
draw from this conclusion the conviction that what the Framers
Democratic Process, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 581 (2010) (“This ‘the speech not the speaker’
approach frames two important moves: first, it concentrates the inquiry on the speech itself, asking if it
is the kind of expression protected by the First Amendment; and second, it reflects constitutional
protection of the deliberative environment rather than the speaker personally.”).
64. Michael Kent Curtis, Citizens United and Davis v. FEC: Lochner on Steroids and Democracy on
Life Support 17 (Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies, Paper No. 1685459, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1685459.
65. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Under the
majority’s view, I suppose it may be a First Amendment problem that corporations are not permitted to
vote, given that voting is, among other things, a form of speech.”). Cf. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Breaching
a Leaking Dam?: Corporate Money and Elections, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 91, 126 (2009) (“[U]nlike
individuals, corporations are not voters and so have no inherent right to influence elections.”).
66. Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 737 (1995).
67. Id. at 809.
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therefore did have in mind was individual speech, and individual
68
speech alone.

As Justice Stevens reminds us in his Citizens United dissent, the
overall point is simple: “The fact that corporations are different from
human beings might seem to need no elaboration, except that the
majority opinion almost completely elides it.”69
Contemporaneously with this anti-theoretical fashion, rights for
corporations have expanded dramatically over the past fifty years.70
As one observer carefully notes:
Despite earlier assertions of corporate personhood in the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment context, corporations did not come to
rely on Bill of Rights protections until quite recently. As late as
1960 the corporation arguably enjoyed only the protection of the
[F]ifth [A]mendment’s due process clause. Today, the
corporation boasts a panoply of Bill of Rights protections: [F]irst
[A]mendment guarantees of political speech, commercial speech,
and negative free speech rights; [F]ourth [A]mendment
safeguards against unreasonable regulatory searches; [F]ifth
[A]mendment double jeopardy and liberty rights; and [S]ixth and
71
[S]eventh [A]mendment entitlements to trial by jury.

As it stands today, “the right against self-incrimination has been
virtually the only part of the Bill of Rights that courts have not
extended to corporations.”72
68. Id.
69. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 971 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Cf. Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1764–65 (“Though there is no social consensus regarding the
effects of increasingly monolithic business entities on American society, there appears to be no
abatement to the expansion of freedoms granted corporate actors, a situation that has raised much
concern.”).
71. Mayer, supra note 12, at 582.
72. Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1752. Corporations also cannot assert the privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Note, Constitutional Rights of the Corporate
Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641, 1644 (1982) (“The corporation may be deprived of privileges and
immunities states normally accord their own citizens . . . .”). This right, however, is essentially dormant
under current jurisprudence.
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Through this expansion of constitutional rights for corporations,
however, corporate theory has—even upon cursory glance—been
shockingly absent. As commentators have variously lamented, “the
Court has adopted an ad hoc, result-oriented approach to corporate
rights, which is difficult to reconcile with traditional modes of
constitutional interpretation”;73 “[m]issing from the Court’s various
decisions involving corporations is any expressly enunciated
common rationale”;74 and “[t]here is no way to bring unity to these
many decisions, for they rest on radically different conceptions of the
person whose rights and duties receive judicial definition.”75
Yet it is likely no coincidence that the death of corporate theory
has coincided with ever-expansive constitutional rights for
corporations. As one commentator correctly observes, “the Court’s
modern, pragmatic, antitheoretical approach is the prosaic
legitimation of the corporation’s constitutional status. This pragmatic
approach is a less controversial guarantor of corporate rights than a
theoretical methodology that raises fundamental questions about the
nature of a corporation and its role in society.”76 Notwithstanding its
convenience, however, such an antitheoretical approach ducks the
basic question of whether an artificial entity, such as a corporation,
should be entitled to constitutional protection.77 Not having a theory
73. Krannich, supra note 21, at 64.
74. O’Kelley, supra note 26, at 1348.
75. Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra note 72, at 1644–45; see also Winkler,
supra note 63, at 195 n.269 (“[A]pplication of individual rights to corporate entities has been
inconsistent.”). As one observer carefully summarizes:
As the Bill of Rights became important to the corporation in the period of Modern
Regulation and Modern Property, the Court jettisoned theories of corporate personhood.
Frequently the Court looked to the history of the amendment in question to justify
corporate rights, as in the case of the [F]ourth [A]mendment; occasionally the Court
examined the underlying purposes of an amendment, as in its handling of the [F]irst
[A]mendment; and sometimes the Court conferred Bill of Rights protections on
corporations with no explanation, as with the [F]ifth, [S]ixth, and [S]eventh
[A]mendments.
Mayer, supra note 12, at 629.
76. Mayer, supra note 12, at 621; see also id. at 643–44 (“As the metaphor of corporations as
persons became increasingly strained, the Court abandoned corporate theory in favor of notions about
commercial property, the free market of ideas, and the historical purposes of each amendment.”).
77. See Krannich, supra note 21, at 62 (“The result is a foundational problem in corporate
constitutional law, for the Court has granted corporations constitutional rights without engaging in the
preliminary inquiry of whether a corporation is entitled to them under the Constitution.”).
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of constitutional personhood is unsettling and does not inspire
confidence, to say the least.78 What Justice Black once pointed out in
the context of the Fourteenth Amendment applies more generally:
“[i]t requires distortion to read ‘person’ as meaning one thing, then
another within the same clause and from clause to clause.”79 Put
bluntly, “[i]n the Court’s corporate constitutional jurisprudence, the
Court has never set forth a specific test to determine what a
constitutional ‘person’ is.”80 In the following section, I venture to
suggest a simple conceptualization.
B. Coherence Of Artificial Entity Theory
The artificial entity theory is the most compelling, with alternative
theories remaining unsatisfactory. The most sophisticated competitor
is likely the associational theory, which seems to analogize
corporations to partnerships, beginning most dramatically with Santa
Clara.81 While it might be superficially attractive to conceptualize
shareholders in corporations as partners in a partnership, “viewing
the corporation as just an aggregate of its shareholders can be
incongruent with modern times, particularly in the large public
company context. Shareholders in publicly traded corporations are
not a static set of identifiable human actors and they do not control
78. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 16, at 1657 (“While the Court has significantly expanded
corporate rights, it has not grounded these expansions in a coherent concept of corporate personhood.”);
Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1759 (“The doctrinal discord in the law of the person results largely from
the lack of a coherent theory of the person. . . . The absence of any coherent theory raises an inference
that courts’ determinations of legal personality are strongly result driven, with judges selecting whatever
theories of personhood suit the outcomes they desire.”); Rivard, supra note 12, at 1445 (“[T]he Supreme
Court has failed to develop a coherent theory of constitutional personhood. Rather, the Court uses theory
merely as a post hoc rationalization to justify result-oriented decisions.”).
79. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 579 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also
Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating Corporate
Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 31 (2001) (“The
Supreme Court treats corporations as the equivalent of human persons for some constitutional
purposes.”); Krannich, supra note 21, at 97 (“The Court has never explained why a corporation is a
person for purposes of double jeopardy, but not for purposes of self-incrimination, despite the fact that
the use of the term ‘persons’ in the clause is analytically indistinguishable.”); Rivard, supra note 12, at
1462.
80. Krannich, supra note 21, at 90.
81. See Mark, supra note 19 at 1463 (“The evidence suggests that Conkling and Justice Field, the
likeliest sources for a new vision of the corporation in Santa Clara, could not have had in mind anything
but the partnership analogy that they had espoused in The Railroad Tax Cases.”).
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day-to-day corporate decision-making.”82 While sophisticated
defenders of associational theories seem to admit this reality,83 they
assume that shareholders will be able to defend themselves against
possible abuses by insiders.84 Sadly, anyone with even a passing
knowledge of corporate law and governance would recognize these
assumptions as heroic.85
The supervening irony here is that rather than empowering
shareholders, the associational theory disenfranchises them by giving
the
corporation—really,
management—standing
to
assert
constitutional claims. As Herbert Hovenkamp insightfully suggests:
The doctrine that a corporation is a constitutional person meant
that the corporation’s directors or managers could assert its
constitutional claims. The less-cited corollary was that
shareholders lacked standing to assert the corporation’s
constitutional rights, just as they lacked standing to represent the
corporation in most legal disputes. Had the doctrine of corporate
constitutional personhood not been developed, corporate
property still would have been protected by the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment. Shareholders, rather than the corporation, would
have been allowed to assert claims for unconstitutional injuries.
82. Pollman, supra note 16, at 1630.
83. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 22, at 133 (“Under the contract theory of the corporation, the
separate corporate entity disappears for constitutional purposes and the speech is attributed to those
immediately responsible for it. Generally this will be the managers who speak or prepare the speech
rather than the shareholders who may fund the speech with their investments.”). Cf. O’Kelley, supra
note 26, at 1363 (“If, for instance, Mobil Oil Corporation pays for an advertisement that expresses
certain social views, the expression involved is not that of the myriad shareholders, but of the top
management of Mobil.”).
84. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 22, at 135 (“[T]he contract theory assumes that the parties to the
corporation, like parties to other types of contracts, can protect themselves by investing in corporate
governance devices that minimize this divergence of interest, and that these contracts are subject to the
same sort of market discipline that applies to other contracts.”).
85. As Russell Stevenson laments:
[A]s the principal institutional means of legitimating and controlling the power of
corporate management, shareholder control is a miserable failure. Moreover, the
perpetuation of the fiction that shareholders do exercise ultimate guiding authority has
acted as a barrier to real institutional reform because the myth provides nominal
legitimation of management power.
Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Corporations and Social Responsibility: In Search of the Corporate Soul, 42
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 709, 731 (1974).
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Thus the Supreme Court’s decisions that a corporation is a
constitutional “person” were an important step in the separation
of ownership from control that characterized the classical
86
corporation.

If one were to assume for a moment that these deep problems can be
overcome, the associational theory still remains unsatisfactory;
especially in its more modern nexus-of-contracts incarnation, where
it criticizes the artificial entity theory for emphasizing the role of the
state.87 But if corporate law is merely contract law, then why
incorporate? Presumably because incorporation saves on transaction
costs and offers protections that private contract simply does not
provide.88
Perhaps more importantly, the associational theory actually
performs precious little work. After all, one must now delineate what
rights are actually “personal” to shareholders but should now be
asserted by the corporation as its proxy—in effect, all this does is
shift the analysis to the slippery debate of what makes a right
“personal.”89 For instance, Bellotti relegates this central question to a
thoroughly unhelpful footnote90 and the recent FCC v. AT & T
decision resorts—somewhat stunningly—to using the dictionary
definition of “personal” to argue that while a statute might define a
corporation as a “person,” the adjective “personal” cannot modify the
right of a corporation.91
86. Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 1641.
87. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 22, at 98 (“The description of the corporation as a ‘mere creature
of law’ implies that government has created rights that cannot be created by private contract.”).
88. Cf. Mayer, supra note 12, at 658–59 (“Besides perpetual life, corporations enjoy limited liability
for industrial accidents such as nuclear power disasters, and the use of voluntary bankruptcy and other
means to dodge financial obligations while remaining in business.”).
89. Other related notions such as “traceability” present similar problems. See, e.g., Bezanson, supra
note 66, at 749 (“The requirement that speech be traceable to the intention and beliefs of individuals in
order for the liberty of speaking to apply is an important factor in the institutional speech
calculus . . . .”).
90. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779 n.14 (1978) (“Whether or not a
particular guarantee is ‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason depends
on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”); see also Rivard, supra
note 12, at 1464.
91. The Court stated that:
“Personal” ordinarily refers to individuals. We do not usually speak of personal
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Finally, even if we assume away the separation of ownership and
control characteristic of the modern public corporation and somehow
magically manage to define what is “personal” to its constitutive
shareholders, at a very basic level the associational theory suffers
from an unrealistic assumption and fallacy. It assumes that the
group’s positions are those of its individual members92 and ignores
the “fact that a right is enjoyed by a person in her individual capacity
says nothing about whether that right should be enjoyed by the
association that she forms along with other individuals.”93
For its part, the natural entity theory is more obviously troubling.
As Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson succinctly observe, “a
corporation is merely a product of legal rules that govern the
relationships between shareholders, directors, and executives,”94
unfortunately, “the rhetorical convention that a corporation is a legal
person remains, though the convention utterly fails to capture the
understanding of the corporation conveyed by any modern theory.”95
Sadly, anthropomorphizing a corporation “does not explain why
corporations would receive constitutional protections as people.”96
Finally, Dewey’s denial of theory as being of little import is
troublesome. As one commentator chronicles, theory can be
outcome-determinative:
Moreover, the Court’s very use of corporate personhood theory
characteristics, personal effects, personal correspondence, personal influence, or personal
tragedy as referring to corporations or other artificial entities. This is not to say that
corporations do not have correspondence, influence, or tragedies of their own, only that
we do not use the word “personal” to describe them.
FCC v. AT & T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1182 (2011).
92. See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 66, at 758 (“[T]here has been substantial reason to doubt that the
speech of the group is a reflection of the views of the individual members.”).
93. Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of Corporate Citizenship, 44
CONN. L. REV. 575, 584 (2012).
94. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124
HARV. L. REV. 83, 108 (2010).
95. Mark, supra note 19, at 1442.
96. Pollman, supra note 16, at 1630; see also Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra
note 72, at 1651 (“The notion that soulless, inarticulate corporations could even hold a political view, let
alone insist on the right to express it, would be incomprehensible to the scholastic philosophers and the
classical economists who provided the conceptual ground for earlier explanations of corporate
personality.”).
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to decide Bill of Rights cases, as in Hale and Morton Salt, belies
Dewey’s claims: there is a perfect correlation between the
invocation of the artificial entity theory and the denial of
corporate rights. Similarly, there is a perfect correlation between
the invocation of the natural entity theory, as in Hale and
Grosjean, and the conferral of corporate rights. In the particular
context of the corporation’s Bill of Rights, the choice of a
97
corporate theory had important consequences.

By contrast, the artificial entity theory accords with common sense
and constitutional history—not to mention it recognizes that
corporations simply cannot exist without the approbation of the state.
First and perhaps most fundamentally, it cannot be overemphasized
that corporations—unlike natural persons—only exist at the will of
the state.98 Further, these artificial creations—again, unlike natural
persons—are neither capable of emotion nor action.99 As one scholar
puts it, “[t]o believe that legal entities are capable of physical acts is a
category-mistake and any superstructure erected on this categorymistake may be invalid.”100 Perhaps this disjunction is why lawyers
need so many contortions to try to convince laypersons that
corporations are people: “[e]ven in a legal world filled with fictions,
the corporate claim to personal Bill of Rights guarantees must appear
fantastic to the non-lawyer.”101 As Justice Rehnquist once
aphoristically noted in dissent, “[t]he insistence on treating
identically for constitutional purposes entities that are demonstrably
97. Mayer, supra note 12, at 640.
98. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 1645 (“But there is one important difference between
the natural person’s right to contract and the corporation’s right: the corporation has only those powers
granted to it by the sovereign.”); Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra note 72, at 1645
(“The corporation thus exists as a person only because it is recognized by the law, and it is granted
standing in the court only because it has been brought into being by the state.”).
99. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 85, at 710 (“[C]orporate ‘persons’ are deficient in that
concatenation of spiritual, social, and political characteristics which in human personalities we call the
‘soul.’”).
100. O’Kelley, supra note 26, at 1351. For example, in the context of the First Amendment, “[t]he
basic intuition is that speech is fundamentally a human act, that for purposes of the First Amendment,
protected speech is primarily a product of the human act of speaking.” Bezanson, supra note 66, at 755.
101. Mayer, supra note 12, at 655; see also Krannich, supra note 21, at 61 (“[A] corporation is simply
not a ‘person’ as most understand the term.”).
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different is as great a jurisprudential sin as treating differently those
entities which are the same.”102
In addition to common sense, artificial entity theory also has
constitutional history on its side. While the word “corporation” does
not exist in the Constitution,103 the balance of historical analysis
suggests that the Founding Fathers would not accord constitutional
personhood to corporations and, in fact, might view the granting of
such powers with disdain. As background, it is important to
remember that the Constitution was written at a time when
“[c]orporations were few and small and of little consequence . . . .”104
Philosophically, however, their “major premise was the existence of
a relatively atomistic society, one devoid of aggregations of political
and economic power greater than those which might be amassed by a
single individual or at most a family or small partnership.”105 In a
detailed historical study, Jonathan Marcantel:
[a]ttempts to discern whether evidence exists indicating that
corporations are real constitutional entities by analyzing
contemporary documents from the Constitutional Convention of
1787, the ratification debates, the ratification debates of the Bill
of Rights, and the debates preceding ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Taken together, the documents indicate
the drafters and ratifiers believed the Constitution and its
amendments protected individual rights. Furthermore, they
indicate the drafters and ratifiers embraced a concessionary
doctrinal vision of the corporation that was inconsistent with

102. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 35 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
103. See, e.g., Harold Anthony Lloyd, A Right But Wrong Place: Righting and Rewriting Citizens
United, 56 S.D. L. REV. 219, 222 (2011) (“On its face, the Constitution provides no corporate
Constitutional rights at all . . . .”); O’Kelley, supra note 26, at 1352 (“Nowhere in the Constitution does
the word ‘corporation’ appear.”); Pollman, supra note 16, at 1632 (“[T]he Constitution itself includes no
specific reference to corporations.”).
104. Arthur Selwyn Miller, Toward the “Techno-Corporate” State?—An Essay in American
Constitutionalism, 14 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1968); see also Pollman, supra note 16, at 1633 (“[S]cholars
agree that before independence there were only a small handful of corporations.”).
105. Stevenson, supra note 85, at 711. Cf. Miller, supra note 104, at 4 (“The 55 men who wrote the
Constitution foresaw neither the rise of the supercorporation nor the Positive State.”).
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106

their vision of constitutional rights.

Some examples might reinforce Marcantel’s point. For instance, as
Randall Bezanson carefully notes:
If the First Amendment were intended to protect all speech
without regard to its identifiable human agency—all words and
images, whatever their origin or intent or effect—there would
have been no reason to single out the press for explicit
constitutional protection. The drafters of the First Amendment
knew that the press was a different kind of speaker than the
107
individual.

In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Black once
forcefully noted the perversion of intent:
I do not believe the word “person” in the Fourteenth
Amendment includes corporations . . . .
....
. . . The history of the amendment proves that the people were
told that its purpose was to protect weak and helpless human
beings and were not told that it was intended to remove
corporations in any fashion from the control of state
governments . . . .
....
. . . Yet, of the cases in this Court in which the Fourteenth
Amendment was applied during the first fifty years after its
adoption, less than one-half of 1 per cent. invoked it in

106. Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L.J. 221, 232 (2011); see also id. at 237 (“First, to the extent the drafters discussed corporations in
the context of constitutional protections, it was only in the sense of state or local authorities as sovereign
corporations. Second, it is clear the drafters did not use the terms ‘corporation’ and ‘people’
coterminously.”).
107. Bezanson, supra note 66, at 775; see also Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights
of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 863 (2007) (“When the Founders established the
principle of free speech in both the Federal and state constitutions, corporate speech was far from their
minds.”).
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protection of the negro race, and more than 50 per cent. asked
108
that its benefits be extended to corporations.

As if common sense and constitutional history were not enough, the
artificial entity theory also recognizes the state’s inextricable role in
the chartering of corporations. The conventional wisdom is that
“[v]iewing the corporation as a concession from the state is a relic of
a time before incorporating became a mere administrative
formality”109—after all, the move from special incorporation statutes
to general incorporation statutes seems to minimize the state’s role.110
But this argument is puzzling: while the steps needed to charter a
corporation are different, the state still maintains a “traditional
constitutive role.”111
A more subtle argument is to note that the availability of different
jurisdictions within which to incorporate also marginalizes the state’s
role.112 But there are several problems with this portability argument.
Most simply, companies tend to incorporate as local subsidiaries
within countries in which they operate for tax and liability reasons; as
such, the local subsidiary exists at the grace of the local sovereign.113
To the extent that the contention revolves around American
companies incorporating in management-friendly jurisdictions—

108. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85, 87, 90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also Krannich, supra note 21, at 95
(“[U]nder the Fourteenth Amendment the Court has created corporate constitutional rights not implied
by the text of the Constitution or the intent of its framers.”); Marcantel, supra note 106, at 265 (“In
sharp distinction, however, the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not envision corporations as
possessing inalienable rights. Quite the contrary, the drafters repeatedly indicated their belief that
corporations existed and were regulated at the leisure of the legislature.”).
109. Pollman, supra note 16, at 1630.
110. See, e.g., id. at 1640 (“The economic expansion of the time [late nineteenth century] and the
transition from special chartering to general incorporation eroded the persuasiveness of the concession
theory [of the corporation], as the connection between a corporate charter and a state act became less
significant.”).
111. Millon, supra note 18, at 7.
112. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 16, at 1661–62 (“Further, as corporations can change their place of
incorporation, switching state or even country, the description of corporations as a concession from a
particular state seems a poor fit in our modern, global environment.”); Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 24
(“[T]he artificial entity theory becomes hard to maintain when management can pick weak countries like
Bermuda as the country of incorporation for the parent of a multinational.”).
113. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 16, at 1660–61.
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notably Delaware—and doing business in other states,114 the state’s
role cannot be so simply dispensed with. First, the company cannot
exist without the approbation of the incorporating state; second, even
today there is little to prohibit additional regulation by a sister state of
the United States.115
In sum, “this marginalization of the State in discussions of theory
of the corporation is incorrect both from a positive as well as
normative perspective.”116 Put simply, “there is no corporation
without the state.”117 Artificial entity theory is the only theory that
recognizes this seemingly banal point.
II. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE THEORY
“Only people can have responsibilities. A corporation is an artificial
person and in this sense may have artificial responsibilities, but
114. Id. at 1640 (explaining that “[s]tates like New Jersey and Delaware began to compete for
corporate taxes and fees by offering a liberal legal environment for incorporation”).
115. Those versed in corporate law might argue that the internal affairs doctrine imposes a barrier to
the regulation of out-of-state corporations. As the U.S. Supreme Court describes it:
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one
State should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters
peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers,
directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a corporation could be faced with
conflicting demands.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 302 cmt. b (1971)). The internal affairs doctrine, however, does not rise to the level of
constitutional imperative. As one commentator observes:
Although the [U.S. Supreme] Court historically has deferred to the law of the state of
incorporation on issues involving internal affairs, that does not mean that the Court has
established a constitutional requirement under the commerce clause mandating that the
law of the state of incorporation be applied on all corporate governance issues.
Arthur R. Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control: State Takeover Statutes after
CTS Corp., 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 764–65 (1988) (footnote omitted). In addition, the guidance
provided by the Restatement of Conflict of Laws provides space to regulate:
The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine such issues,
except in the unusual case where, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has
a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local
law of the other state will be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2); see generally Richard M. Buxbaum, The
Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CALIF. L.
REV. 29 (1987).
116. Stefan J. Padfield, Finding State Action When Corporations Govern, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 703, 724
(2009).
117. Id. at 720.
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‘business’ as a whole cannot be said to have responsibilities, even in
this vague sense.”
—Milton Friedman118
If, as I have argued in Part I, the artificial entity theory makes so
much sense, then why is it so unpopular? The response lies in
political economy. Instrumental reasons explain the decline of
artificial entity theory: an anti-regulatory agenda and a concomitant
wish to elevate the managerial class. To be sure, there are opposing
concerns that might emerge to my proposal to restrict the personhood
of corporations. Some might characterize it as too simplistic an
approach; others might suggest it would hinder attempts to find
corporations liable under criminal or international law. But upon
closer examination, neither of these concerns is convincing.
A. Decline Of Artificial Entity Theory
Conceptualizing the corporation as an artificial entity necessarily
allows the government to place limits on its behavior. After all, if the
corporation is a creature of the state, then the state can regulate it if it
wishes. Further, the more the state’s role is emphasized, the less
power accrues to corporate insiders. I argue that anti-regulatory
fervor, coupled with a desire to elevate the managerial class in
society, best explain why artificial entity theory has fallen out of
favor. Instrumental reasons explain the rise of the associational and
natural entity theories more than logic might.
Under the artificial entity theory, as David Millon has succinctly
noted, “[b]ecause the corporate person was a creature of the state, it
was assumed to be subject to whatever limitations or regulatory
burdens might emerge from the political process.”119 In contrast,
“[b]y appealing to the individual property rights of the shareholders,
the aggregate idea offered a potentially useful theoretical justification
118. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at SM17.
119. Millon, supra note 18, at 5; see also Pollman, supra note 16, at 1635 (“Under this [artificial
entity] view the corporation is a legal fiction and incorporation a special privilege or concession
awarded by the state. Accordingly, this view supported the government-imposed limitations on
corporations of the time because if incorporation is a state grant, it follows that it can be a limited one.”).
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for shielding big business from public supervision.”120 The natural
entity theory places government at an even greater distance. As
Morton Horwitz notes, “[t]he main effect of the natural entity theory
of the business corporation was to legitimate large scale enterprise
and to destroy any special basis for state regulation of the corporation
that derived from its creation by the state.”121 The rhetoric of natural
entity theory is especially powerful: by equating “corporation” to
“person,” one is then tempted to transpose the rights of the latter to
the former.122
New corporate theories have thus brilliantly served an antiregulatory agenda. As Walter Hamilton amusingly observes:
The legal make-believe that the corporation is a person, the
ingenuities by which it has been fitted out with a domicile, the
elaborate web of “as-ifs” which the courts have woven,—have
put corporate affairs pretty largely out of reach of the regulations
we decree. . . . ”The corporation” . . . has no anatomical parts to
be kicked or consigned to calaboose; no conscience to keep it
awake all night; no soul for whose salvation the parson may
struggle; no body to be roasted in hell or purged for celestial
enjoyment. . . . [We cannot lay] bodily hands upon General
Motors or, Westinghouse . . . [or] incarcerate the Pennsylvania
123
Railroad or Standard Oil (N.J.) complete with all its works.

120. Millon, supra note 18, at 5. The idea is essentially the same under the more modern association
of contracts notion. See id. at 21 (“Efforts by government to impose obligations on the parties to these
arrangements offend the freedom of contract, anti-redistributive ideology that lies at the heart of the
nexus-of-contracts agenda.”).
121. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 221; see also Rivard, supra note 12, at 1459 (“In contrast to the
artificial entity theory, the natural entity—or real entity—theory of the corporation constrains the power
of the state to control its creation.”).
122. See Mark, supra note 19, at 1472 (“‘Person’ carried with it powerful connotations in AngloAmerican jurisprudence. The irreducible unit of the common law was the individual person; if the
corporation was a real person, not an artificial creation of the state, was it not entitled to the same
respect as any flesh-and-blood person?”).
123. RICHARD EELLS & CLARENCE WALTON, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUSINESS: AN
OUTLINE OF THE MAJOR IDEAS SUSTAINING BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 132, 133
(1961) (quoting Walter H. Hamilton, On the Composition of the Corporate Veil, Address Before the
Brandeis Lawyers’ Society (Mar. 21, 1946), in BRANDEIS LAWYERS’ SOC’Y PUBL’NS, 1946, at 4).
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The risk of all the deference given to corporations and their insiders
is the drifting toward a new Lochnerism. In the words of one scholar:
More than the problems of personhood metaphors, concerns
about judicial legitimacy explain the demise of corporate theory.
The bestowal of constitutional rights on corporations, via the
natural entity theory, raises the specter of Lochner. . . .
....
. . . In the modern political economy, the question, what is a
corporation, is every bit as important as the questions about
freedom of contract and common-law entitlements considered
during the Lochner period. For the Court to appear to be
imposing its view of the corporation—and therefore shaping a
state and imposing an economic view—creates problems of
124
legitimacy reminiscent of Lochner.

As one commentator aptly observed, “[d]enied the protections of
Lochner and substantive due process, corporate managers merely
shifted the constitutional battle from the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment
to the [F]irst, [F]ourth, and [F]ifth amendments.”125 As such,
“[b]usinesses now wield the Bill of Rights in much the same way that
the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment was used during the Progressive era
when corporations impeded state governmental regulation with
constitutional roadblocks.”126
Beyond a desire to fight regulation, the move away from artificial
entity theory and eventually toward natural entity theory effectively
provides constitutional cover for the activities of corporate insiders.
As Herbert Hovenkamp has chronicled, by the late nineteenth
124. Mayer, supra note 12, at 645, 646.
125. Id. at 606.
126. Id. at 577; see also Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the
First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 295 (1981) (“Particularly with respect to corporate commercial
speech, the First Amendment should not become the vehicle for restoring the lenses of the Lochner
court to judicial scrutiny of economic regulation of either legislative or executive origin.”). Cf. Miller,
supra note 104, at 5 (“By the mid-1960’s that ‘social revolution’ had become so solidified that
corporations seem part of the ‘natural’ order of things, so much so that no serious intellectual opposition
to them is evident.”).
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century, “the business corporation gradually evolved into a device for
assembling large amounts of capital in a manner that could be
controlled efficiently by a small number of managers.”127 The
problem, of course, is that even the associational view ostensibly
emphasizes the property rights of shareholder-principals, not
manager-agents.128 The rather hefty task, then, was somehow to craft
theoretical support for management control over large
corporations.129
At this challenge, the real entity theory proved brilliant. Arguably,
two subtle analytical moves are at work: first, anthropomorphize the
corporate entity to somehow detach it from its shareholderprincipals;130 second, effectively emphasize how the now
anthropomorphized entity can be represented by its directors and
officers.131 It is also important to note that the real entity theory also
emerged in a symbiotic relationship with a remarkable liberalization
of corporate law during the late nineteenth century that only further
legitimated the power of management over shareholders. As Adam
Winkler chronicles in helpful detail:
Traditional doctrines of ultra vires and quo warranto, which
strictly limited corporate activities to those specified at inception
or provided for in corporate charters, were watered down—
another expansion of managerial autonomy. The discretion of
managers over corporate affairs was also augmented by the
127. Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 1595.
128. See, e.g., O’Kelley, supra note 26, at 1373 (“In the case of a large corporation, however, the
views of shareholders and management may diverge, making the associational rationale inapplicable.”).
As Morton Horwitz observes, “[s]ome of the contractualists seemed to have in the back of their minds
an ideal of what in a later age would be called ‘shareholder democracy.’ But during the 1880s it was
beginning to become clear that management, not shareholders, were the real decision-makers in large
publicly owned enterprises.” Horwitz, supra note 11, at 206.
129. See Mark, supra note 19, at 1475 (“The task before those theorists was to explain how
management control was legitimate.”).
130. See Marcantel, supra note 106, at 228 (“As the structure of corporations changed and became
more management controlled, corporations began to be viewed as no longer representing the rights of
the individuals who composed them, but rather, as separate bodies that possessed their own values and
desires independent of their shareholders.”).
131. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 19, at 1477 (“The psychological assimilation of the corporation to the
individual contained the connotative powers of personification while the representative analysis set out
by Ernst Freund provided a justification for management’s assumption of control of corporate affairs.”).
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replacement of common law negligence rules governing
corporate agency with the notoriously management-friendly
business judgment rule. Stockholders witnessed the diminution
of their right to oversee management through inspection of the
corporate account books and ledgers, as state lawmakers
restricted inspection rights (purportedly to guard against
corporate espionage). Voting rules within the corporation were
also transformed in ways that minimized stockholder authority:
unanimity requirements for fundamental corporate changes
became majority rules; preferred shares were sold without any
right to vote attached; and proxy voting, as indicated by the
example of insurance companies above, ensconced management
132
control over firm assets.

Helped along by corporate law and concomitant with the rise in
industrial organization, by the 1920s the real entity theorists had
essentially won: management was ascendant.133 Sadly enough, the
past century has seen an erosion of shareholder capitalism.134 Reuven
Avi-Yonah sums up our sorry state of affairs:
Why does the real entity view prevail? In part, this is no doubt
due to the fact that it represents the most congenial view to
corporate management, because it shields them from undue
interference from both shareholders and the state. Corporate
132. Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance
Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 907–09 (2004); see also Horwitz, supra note 11, at 183 (“The triumph of the
entity theory parallels another development in late nineteenth century corporate law—the tendency to
shift power away from shareholders, first in favor of directors and later to professional managers.”).
133. See, e.g., Marcantel, supra note 106, at 228 (“And, as those entities grew in size and became
more controlled by management as opposed to shareholders, the real entity theory grew in
prominence.”); Mark, supra note 19, at 1474 (“The ascendance of management strengthened the
analytic force of the real person/real entity theory and was in turn legitimated by it.”).
134. As the mutual fund pioneer, John Bogle, laments:
[C]apitalism has been moving in the wrong direction. We need to reverse its course so
that the system is once again run in the interest of stockholder-owners rather than in the
interest of managers . . . .
....
Our society today, then, is no longer an “ownership society.” It has become and
“intermediation society,” and it is not going back.
JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM xi (2005).
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management wields political power and it influences the
outcome of the debate; judges again and again refer to the
importance of corporations, by which they mean corporate
135
management.

Yet the world Avi-Yonah summarizes so well effectively privileges a
small class of corporate insiders with access to corporate resources—
in a way that is deeply problematic. Not only does it deemphasize the
property rights of shareholder-principals,136 it does so in a way that is
antithetical to the principles embodied in our Constitution.137 In the
words of one scholar:
The philosophy of private property that informed our founding
fathers falls apart in a system in which the owners of property no
longer direct its use. The corporate person is not, the
protestations of corporate managers to the contrary
notwithstanding, a member of society in the same sense as the
individual person. There is no effective mechanism for
socializing a corporation. It cannot be educated. It cannot be
shamed. To an increasing extent society is not even capable of
punishing it. The result is an institution truly responsible to no

135. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 25; see also Horwitz, supra note 11, at 183 (“The collapse of the
grant [artificial entity] theory eventually produced the best of all possible worlds for the expansion of
corporate power.”); Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1754 (“At least, it does not seem a coincidence that
as the increasingly complex modern corporation has become increasingly dependent on Bill of Rights
protections and the American economy has become increasingly dependent on corporations, courts have
adjusted definitions of personhood to accommodate the modern corporation’s need for these
protections.”).
136. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 85, at 713 (“It has long since been recognized that corporations
are no longer run for the benefit of shareholders by a management responsive to shareholders, but are by
and large run by and for a management for whom shareholder benefit is a secondary concern.”).
137. For instance, in the context of the First Amendment, “[Bellotti] does not in itself further the
values protected by the First Amendment. Instead, it constitutionally legitimizes management’s
discretionary power to use corporate funds in expressing the political views of those who run the
corporation.” Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra note 72, at 1655; see also O’Kelley,
supra note 26, at 1351 (“Expression is possible only by natural persons, not by corporations. Only a
natural person may express himself through a political expenditure. Any expenditure of corporate assets
for political purposes must be an expression of the natural persons who authorize and direct the
expenditure.”).
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138

A fundamental question becomes whether a legal instrument such as
the Bill of Rights, which was designed to protect minorities from the
“tyranny of the majority” have led instead “to a tyranny of the
minority in which the corporate form is manipulated to magnify
managerial power.”139
B. Some Misplaced Concerns
Some thoughtful readers might be concerned about my proposal to
restrict the personhood of corporations. Some might characterize it as
too simplistic and stark an approach; others might suggest that it
would set back efforts to find corporations liable under criminal or
international law. I argue, however, that while these concerns appear
serious at first glance, upon closer scrutiny, neither is convincing.
A critique might begin by noting that not offering constitutional
protections to corporations is too reductionist an approach. After all,
are there not situations where the corporation might be exerting a
right analogous to an individual’s “personal” right?140 As discussed
in detail above,141 however, this move merely shifts the analytical
focus to determining what is “personal”—an unsatisfactory, and
arguably fruitless, exercise. A more intellectually consistent approach
centers on recognizing that corporations are creatures of statute; as
such, they only deserve rights granted to them by statute. To belabor
the obvious, individuals can choose not to form corporations, and
138. Stevenson, supra note 85, at 713 (emphasis added).
139. Mayer, supra note 12, at 657; see also Horwitz, supra note 11, at 183 (“[T]he [real] entity theory
produced court decisions that promoted oligarchical tendencies within the business corporation.”);
Miller, supra note 104, at 40 (“‘Managerial capitalism’ in many respects differs little from ‘managerial
socialism’; the industrial enterprises of both systems are basically similar.”). Cf. Stevenson, supra note
85, at 721 (“If forced to choose between the view that ‘the business of business is business’ and the view
that corporations are perfectly free to wield their economic and political muscle to bring about whatever
changes in society happen to be thought desirable by a self-perpetuating management oligarchy, I for
one would ardently advocate the former.”).
140. See, e.g., Krannich, supra note 21, at 106 (“More explicitly, a corporation would only be entitled
to a constitutional right if the values and policies underlying the right are such that the reasons a natural
person is entitled to the right apply equally to a corporation.”).
141. See supra Part I.B.
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states could even choose not to charter them.142 Human beings
deserve constitutional protection against possible abuses wrought
upon them by majoritarian politics; corporations do not.143
A related, though more nuanced, criticism is that diminishing the
personhood of corporations might jeopardize the liability of
corporations under criminal law—perhaps counterintuitively, early
real entity theorists argued for corporate criminal liability and
artificial entity theorists fought against it.144 Yet again, however, this
concern belies crucial differences. To begin with, corporate criminal
liability has generally emerged through statutes—not common law.145
142. Cf. Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra note 72, at 1643 (“If the public good is
not served by unrestricted corporate involvement in the political process, legislatures are free to limit the
body corporate to the activity for which it was called into being: business.”).
143. Here, I permit myself to diverge from the views of very thoughtful commentators. For example,
Victor Brudney argues that:
Corporations are accorded “personality” in order to create a mechanism for saving
transaction costs in business dealings, not to create autonomous beings. Accordingly,
they may be deemed legal “persons” separate from their stockholders for many
constitutional purposes, particularly when corporate dealings with third persons involve
contract rights, ownership of property, or liability for injuries. Moreover, corporations
that are in the business of communicating have special ground for claiming protection
under the First Amendment.
Brudney, supra note 126, at 240 (footnote omitted). While I agree entirely with the first sentence, I am
not sure why corporate “contract rights, ownership of property, or liability for injuries” cannot be dealt
with by statute. “Corporations that are in the business of communicating” could similarly be protected
by statute—not to mention that there is a specific Press Clause to protect institutional speech. This
seems to be a point that Brudney appears to acknowledge as well. See id. at 290 (“But whatever may be
the difficulties at the margin, in general the distinction between communications businesses, which are
anchored in activities that First Amendment press and association rights protect, and other businesses
can be articulated in regulatory legislation.”).
144. See Lipton, supra note 12, at 1930 (“In the prevailing historical narrative, real entity theorists are
the proponents of unrestricted corporate power, and artificial entity theorists are the guardians of the
public interest. Yet, these roles were actually reversed in the context of corporate crime.”).
145. As one observer summarizes:
Under the common law, criminal acts were thought to be beyond the corporate purpose
and therefore unattributable to the corporate group. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, however, Congress and state legislatures enacted statutes that made
corporations criminally liable for violating certain statutory provisions, while at the same
time courts became increasingly amenable to the idea of corporate criminal intent.
Id. at 1913. Cf. Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L
REV. 105, 123–24 (1888) (“It has often been questioned whether a corporation could commit a tort or
crime. The better opinion in the Roman law seems to have been that the question should be answered in
the negative, at least whenever dolus or culpa was necessary to make the act under consideration
wrongful.”). To be sure, courts have imported common law concepts to fulfill elements of criminal
liability such as mens rea and actus reus, but the doctrine has evolved in the shadow of statutes and, as
some have argued, with little justification. Pollman, supra note 16, at 1648 (“With little theoretical
grounding, courts imported tort and agency principles to hold corporations vicariously liable for
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As such, there is nothing in my approach that precludes legislatures
from imposing criminal liability on corporations.
What about criminal procedure? One supervening irony is that
criminal liability has actually spawned constitutional protections for
corporations.146 Further, the extension of corporate personality
through cases such as Citizens United will only enhance the argument
that corporations are deserving of even more procedural protections
under the Constitution. For instance, as Christopher Slobogin
insightfully asks with respect to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments:
If corporations are entitled to freedom of speech, and
protection from unregulated government intrusion is necessary to
ensure that speech is freely exercised, the Fourth Amendment’s
application to corporations may need to be revisited. . . .
....
The same goes for the privilege against self-incrimination,
which up to now has not applied to corporations. . . .[I]f
corporations can possess and exercise a right to speak (per
Citizens United), they can possess and assert a right not to
147
speak.

Along the lines of Slobogin’s concern, there is emerging literature on
whether, as corporations are increasingly equated to people,
mechanisms such as deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements will pass constitutional muster.148 By contrast, under my
criminal acts performed by corporate agents within the scope of employment.”).
146. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 16, at 1648 (“This is striking because many of the constitutional
rights that corporations enjoy are an outgrowth of the Court’s recognition of the corporation as subject
to criminal liability. For example, if corporations were not subject to criminal liability there would be no
need to consider whether they should receive double jeopardy protection.”).
147. Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United & Corporate & Human Crime, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 77, 83,
84 (2010).
148. For example:
Viewed in light of the Court’s traditional understanding that corporations are considered
to be “persons” under the Constitution, the majority’s suggestion in Citizens United that
corporations are equal to human beings, at least under the First Amendment’s Free
Speech Clause, likely affects the way that corporations’ alleged criminal conduct is
investigated by the government and the manner in which the government addresses
corporate misconduct. Specifically, a number of standard conditions currently included in
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approach, corporations would be stripped of these constitutional
rights: to the extent legislatures wish to impose criminal liability,
they can also provide procedural safeguards by statute.
There is a deeper debate, however, that I hope will emerge: is the
imposition of criminal liability on corporations even a good idea?
After all, sanctions are limited to fines which too often have little
deterrent effect, especially given that shareholders are left paying
them in the end.149 Sadly, corporate agents might view reprehensible
conduct not in terms of its inherent immorality, but as an economic
calculation. The concerns of one scholar, written over a century ago,
are strikingly contemporary:
Let me ask, if any board of directors, who ever started any
corporation on a course of criminality, ever was visited with the
contempt, commission of the same acts by them as individuals
would have entailed? Do they, indeed, when they authorize
corporate crime, feel the same contempt for themselves that they
ought to feel? On the contrary, the commission of such offenses
is more apt to be discussed around a council board of directors
with respect solely to its financial risk. They become, or tend to
become, the soulless intellectual agencies of a soulless nonintellectual machine. When that point is arrived at, law is to them
nothing in its majesty, and merely a tyrannical barrier to greed.
But, if a board of directors who authorize or permit a
deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements may have to be altered
or eliminated altogether in response to the humanization of the corporate entity following
Citizens United.
Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate Entity: Changing Views of Corporate Criminal
Liability in the Wake of Citizens United 51 (June 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://works.bepress.com/elizabeth_sheyn/1.
149. As Russell Stevenson observes:
An additional problem with regulatory legislation is that most laws intended to regulate
corporate activity have relied, either explicitly in the design of the statute, or by virtue of
the way it is applied in practice, on sanctions directed not at the real people who actually
make corporate decisions, but at the fictional corporate persona. The corporation is, as
should be known by now, uniquely insensitive to the moral suasion of statutory rules.
And where, as is usually the case, fiscal penalties imposed are nominal relative to the size
of the institution on which they are imposed, regulatory statutes influence corporate
behavior far less than we would desire.
Stevenson, supra note 85, at 722.
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corporation to disobey statutes, are put in jail or are condemned
to wear felons’ stripes, will they, in any gamble upon violation
150
gathering dividends for others, defy the law’s commands?

Perhaps most crucially, imposing criminal liability on the
corporation, a piece of paper, conveniently deflects attention from the
actual wrongdoers:
[W]e will come greatly nearer to reducing corporate criminal
violation when we get back to the common-law theory, and more
convincing will be the thought that nobody can authorize
anybody or anything to commit a crime. Then all agents of
corporations will be like agents of individuals. If they violate
law, there will be no force or power to stand between them and
151
its vindication.

Or put more starkly, in the words of Charles Reich, “[o]ne of the
great modern ‘inventions’ is the avoidance of personal responsibility
by use of the organizational form.”152
In an analogous critique to that focused on domestic criminal law,
one might oppose my proposal on the theory that it would hinder
attempts to find corporations liable under customary international
law. After all, it would be tempting to find corporations “liable for
committing, or for their complicity in, human rights violations
amounting to international crimes, including genocide, slavery,
human trafficking, forced labor, torture and crimes against
humanity.”153 Indeed, a particularly relevant and controversial

150. N.C. Collier, Impolicy of Modern Decision and Statute Making Corporations Indictable and the
Confusion in Morals Thus Created, 71 CENT. L.J. 421, 427 (1910).
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. REICH, supra note 29, at 173.
153. Larry Catá Backer, The United Nations’ “Protect-Respect-Remedy” Project: Operationalizing a
Global Human Rights Based Framework for the Regulation of Transnational Corporations 19 (Mar. 12–
13, 2010) (unpublished conference paper), available at http://law.scu.edu/corplaw/file/Santa-ClaraSymposium-Larry-Cata-Backer-Paper-Draft.pdf.
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example would be the argument that corporations should be brought
to justice under the Alien Tort Statute.154
While this argument is very seductive, here too there are several
responses. First, and by analogy to domestic criminal law and its
statutes, if the international community wishes to impose liability on
corporations, it is free to do so through treaties. Second, more
fundamentally and again drawing parallels to criminal law, one
wonders whether imposing criminal liability on corporations again
serves as a convenient deflection away from those with real
responsibility. As Judge José Cabranes of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit recently noted in his majority opinion
in Kiobel:
From the beginning, however, the principle of individual
liability for violations of international law has been limited to
natural persons—not “juridical” persons such as corporations—
because the moral responsibility for a crime so heinous and
unbounded as to rise to the level of an “international crime” has
rested solely with the individual men and women who have
155
perpetrated it.

As Judge Leval thoughtfully observed when he concurred in the
majority’s judgment:
A corporation, having no body, no soul, and no conscience, is
incapable of suffering, of remorse, or of pragmatic reassessment
of its future behavior. Nor can it be incapacitated by
imprisonment. The only form of punishment readily imposed on
a corporation is a fine, and this form of punishment, because its
burden falls on the corporation’s owners or creditors (or even
possibly its customers if it can succeed in passing on its costs in
154. The statute itself is notoriously ambiguous, stating merely that “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
155. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added), cert
denied, 132 S. Ct. 248 (2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
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increased prices), may well fail to hurt the persons who were
responsible for the corporation’s misdeeds. Furthermore, when
the time comes to impose punishment for past misdeeds, the
corporation’s owners, directors, and employees may be
completely different persons from those who held the positions
at the time of the misconduct. What is more, criminal
prosecution of the corporation can undermine the objectives of
criminal law by misdirecting prosecution away from those
deserving of punishment. . . . For these reasons, criminal
prosecution of corporations is unknown in many nations of the
156
world and is not practiced in international criminal tribunals.

Third, and perhaps most subtly, while treating corporations as
“subjects” of international law may appear seductive from a criminal
liability standpoint, it could open up a panoply of rights that
corporations might claim as “people.” As José Alvarez has
convincingly argued, “[c]ontrary to what many human rights
advocates apparently believe, those who want to hold corporations
accountable for international law violations should not be so quick to
assume that they want corporations to be ‘subjects’ of international
law.”157 At one level, his point seems straightforward: human rights
lawyers should not get trapped in the contradiction of wanting
corporations to be “subjects” of international law when trying to find
corporations liable but denying this status when corporations wish to
assert their rights.158 But using the international investment regime—
where, perhaps stunningly, corporations are treated as states in their
ability to enforce treaty rights directly159—Alvarez also makes a very
sophisticated point:
156. Id. at 168 (Leval, J., concurring).
157. José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L
L. 1, 3 (2011).
158. See id. at 23 (“Human rights advocates have paid little attention to the fundamental
contradictions of insisting that corporations are ‘international legal persons’ or ‘subjects’ for purposes of
imposing obligations on them (as in ATCA litigation) and resisting that outcome when it comes to
finding international rights for corporations (as in the investment regime).”).
159. As Alvarez notes, “[u]nder most contemporary investment treaties, foreign investors have the
right to bring direct claims for violations of their treaty rights in various arbitral forums, including the
World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).” Id. at 11. The
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One of the general rationales offered for establishing this
innovative international [investment] regime is precisely that
suggested by the majority in Citizens United: Corporations have
a legitimate role to play in constructing the rule of law and
democratic society and their rights as persons should be
respected no less than others. The investment regime just takes
this rationale one step further to argue that foreign businesses
should be able to bring international claims against the home
160
states in which they operate.

To be sure, this analysis does elide the fact that the investment
regime is treaty-based, whereas customary international law is not.
But overall, Alvarez’s point is a very powerful one that in many ways
parallels those of Christopher Slobogin in the domestic criminal
context: the more corporations are deemed “persons,” the greater
rights they will claim.161 So simply treating a corporation as a
“person” or “subject” resolves precious little. In the end, as Alvarez
warns, “[i]nternational lawyers should spend their time addressing
which international rules apply to corporations rather than whether
corporations are or are not ‘subjects’ of international law.”162

features of this regime, however, are troubling:
Under investor-state arbitration, therefore, states are mostly passive participants in a
game controlled by corporate plaintiffs in which the latter play the jurisgenerative role
that in the WTO and throughout much of international law is formally reserved to states.
As students of the burgeoning investor-state arbitral case law attest, states have in effect
delegated the making of international investment law to third party private attorneys
general, namely the wealthy multinationals that can afford to bring the cases and generate
the case law.
Id. at 11–12.
160. Id. at 14; see also id. at 23 (“The principal lesson to take from decisions like Citizens United is
simple: Beware the consequences of equating corporations to persons.”).
161. See Slobogin, supra note 147, at 83–84.
162. Alvarez, supra note 157, at 31; see also id. at 30 (“[T]he only viable approach is to delineate
corporate rights and obligations inductively from the bottom up: to define the rights and obligations of
corporations by what those entities are and what they are not.”).
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III. REFRAMING THE DEBATE: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST
CORPORATIONS?
History appears to exhibit a cycle in which social organization
is sometimes dominated by organization and ascendant power,
and at other times by highly individualized life with a high
degree of individualized possessory property. The core of the
feudal system rested not on property but on power. This was
gradually dispersed: the collectivized power of the feudal dukes
dissipated into the individual titles of tiny landholders in the
nineteenth century. The industrial era appears to have compelled
a large measure of recollectivization of property. . . . In great
areas, we have moved away from the individual and possessory
property stage into a stage of great organization. But
organization, economic as well as political, turns on power, not
on title. Protection of individual liberty might possibly be carried
out by impeding or preventing recollectivization of economic
function with its attendant increase of power in private or public
hands or in both working together.
163
—Adolf Berle

Having spent the bulk of this Article arguing that corporations
should not be given constitutional rights, it might be worthwhile to
end by asking if the debate about whether corporations deserve
constitutional protection is even the right one to have. Rather than
asking whether corporations should benefit from constitutional rights,
the appropriate inquiry may be whether human beings should be able
to assert constitutional rights against corporations. Put starkly,
current jurisprudential debates might be arguing the wrong
question.164

163. A. A. Berle, Jr., The Developing Law of Corporate Concentration, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 639, 660
(1952).
164. Cf. Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1699 (1989)
(“There is, of course, something worse than asking unintelligible questions—and that is answering
them.”).
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As Charles Reich has provocatively argued, perhaps we have
deluded ourselves into a bifurcation between “public” and “private”:
By dividing America into these two sectors, we are given a view
of reality where the private individual and the giant corporation
are considered to be alike. All distinctions between the personal
zone of individuals and the organized zone of corporate power
are wiped out. . . . The existence of a deepening conflict between
the interests of individuals and the interest of “private”
165
corporations is rendered invisible.

Crucially, “[t]he image of the ‘private sector’ as a zone of freedom is
further supported by describing our economy as a ‘free market’ rather
than a carefully managed system with restricted opportunity. The
market image suggests free and equal individuals exchanging
handmade shoes for homegrown geese in a village square.”166
Contrary to this idyllic idealization, Reich argues that “it is big
business, not big government, that primarily regulates the lives of
ordinary Americans”167—a pernicious phenomenon he labels
“economic government.”168
The great stumbling block to such a project, of course, is the state
action doctrine: corporations are not public actors against whom
individuals typically assert constitutional rights.169 Yet this roadblock
165. REICH, supra note 29, at 159–60 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 161.
167. Id. at 41; see also id. at 77 (“The world of 1776, when Adam Smith published his book
describing the free market, has been replaced by a centralized and highly organized economy; it is
absurd to assume that the Adam Smith economic model still operates in the same way.”); Id. at 169 (“A
managerial economy is morally different from a free market because the individual’s economic fate is
controlled by others who thereby incur responsibility for their exercise of power.”).
168. See, e.g., id. at 20 (“Economic government is the dominant partner, public government the
subordinate, in the totality of government that affects our daily lives.”); Id. at 21 (“Through its control of
jobs and our livelihood, economic government is responsible for far more coercion in our daily lives
than public government.”). For a similar argument, see Stevenson, supra note 85, at 729. “There are
those who predict that, as the city-state gave way to the nation-state, so the nation-state will eventually
give way to the corporation as our principal socio-political institution.” Id.
169. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 104, at 65 (“[I]f due process of law is to become the way in which a
measure of accountability is brought to the corporate enterprise, one major constitutional leap must be
taken, namely, the concept of ‘state action’ will have to be dropped by the Supreme Court, at least in
part.”).
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can be overcome by recognizing both the state’s role in chartering
corporations and the significant impact private corporations have on
the welfare of individuals.
First, corporations would not exist without the state’s approbation.
There is little doubt that the drafters of our Constitution would not
instantly recognize this fundamental reality. As Adolf Berle wryly
observes:
Had the question come up, let us say, in 1800, when there were
only 300 recorded corporations in the United States, all of which
derived their authority from the states or predecessor colonies,
the lawyer arguing that they were purely private and, because
private, not within the scope of constitutional limitations on
governmental action would have had the difficult side of the
170
argument.

Even today, “[t]he fact that the state benefits from granting corporate
charters, combined with the corporation’s dependence on stategranted limited liability (and other unique benefits of corporate
status), suggests a symbiotic relationship between the state and the
private corporation that is relevant to state action doctrine analysis
under current precedents.”171
It is difficult to deny the basic premise that corporations “are
created by the State as a means of furthering the public welfare.”172
As such, “[t]he private practice of a corporation (or apparently any
aggregate body) taken under or in furtherance of a privilege granted
170. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of Personal
Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 945 (1952).
171. Padfield, supra note 116, at 726. As Padfield elaborates:
First, the corporation does not exist without the State and the State derives significant
benefits in exchange for granting corporate status . . . . Second, the abuse of the corporate
form for illegitimate governing is foreseeable and has been predicted since the 1800s, but
state law nevertheless encourages this type of abuse by making shareholder wealth
maximization the priority of corporate management and protecting those managers from
personal liability via doctrines such as the business judgment rule . . . . Third, the
democratic process has arguably failed to keep the accumulation of corporate power in
check and therefore it falls to the judiciary to rein in the abuse of that power.
Id. at 703 (emphasis omitted).
172. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 818 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
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by the state falls within the area of constitutional control.”173 In sum,
one response to the lack of state action critique is “that the
corporation, itself a creation of the state, is as subject to
constitutional limitations which limit action as is the state itself.”174
Second, and beyond the debates about whether the outsourcing of
government functions renders state action doctrine problematic,175
large corporations control resources that often exceed those of the
governments that created them.176 Thus, they affect the welfare of
individuals in a manner that rivals, and might even surpass, that of
government. As Erwin Chemerinsky observes, “the concentration of
wealth and power in private hands, for example, in large
corporations, makes the effect of private actions in certain cases
virtually indistinguishable from the impact of governmental
conduct.”177 As another scholar asks:
If the sovereign state of Delaware is subject to the limitations of
the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, then why should not the
“corporate state” of DuPont or General Motors? By applying the
Constitution to such entities—by “constitutionalizing” the
supercorporation—it may be possible to retain the benefits
flowing from the private ownership of business while
simultaneously attaining a higher degree of fairness in the social
173. Berle, supra note 170, at 951; see also id. at 952 (“Implicitly, it would seem, state action in
granting a corporate charter assumes that the corporation will not exercise its power (granted in theory at
least to forward a state purpose) in a manner forbidden the state itself.”).
174. Id. at 942. As Russell Stevenson observes:
Although it is a point often lost sight of, corporations are the recipients of a grant of
important privileges and rather substantial powers from the state, and it seems not at all
unreasonable to suggest that those powers and privileges ought to be used in the public
interest and, to that end, that their exercise might properly be subjected to certain
conditions. Corporations were historically viewed as much as instrumentalities of the
state as centers of independent private power.
Stevenson, supra note 85, at 728.
175. See, e.g., Padfield, supra note 116, at 712 (“[O]utsourcing of inherently governmental functions
via privatization is another way in which corporations can end up in governing roles.”).
176. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 85, at 728 (noting “a world in which large corporations control
resources and wield powers which dwarf those of state governments, and indeed, in the case of the
largest corporations, the governments of all but a handful of nations”).
177. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 510–11 (1985); see also
Krannich, supra note 21, at 100 (“Modern business corporations have the capacity to aggregate enough
power and influence to rival governmental institutions.”).
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After all, “[t]he power of many large corporations over the lives of
their employees, the residents of the communities in which they
operate, and even their customers, often surpasses in practical impact
that of the state governments to whose laws corporations nominally
owe their existence.”179 As Adolf Berle elegantly argued in the
1950s:
The thrust of the doctrine here propounded is precisely that
where the corporation by reason of size or of degree of
concentration has acquired power giving it the capacity to
impede personality or personal life it has become, [tanto
quanto], an arm of the state both because it is a state chartered
corporation and because it is relied on by the community as a
180
necessary part of its economic function.

In the tradition of Berle, Reich laments that while “[p]ublic
government is limited in what it can do to individuals by the
provisions of the Constitution; private government is subject to no
such limitations.”181 But the situation is actually far worse than what
Reich describes: not only are private corporations not subject to
constitutional restraints, they are using the Constitution both as an
178. Miller, supra note 104, at 65. Other scholars echo these concerns:
Viewed in the large, the proposition that the government of the state of Arizona or the
City Council of Keokuk, Iowa, are subject in all respects to the restraints of that
formidable body of constitutional law known as “due process”—which comprehends
among other things most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights—but that the General
Motors Corporation or American Telephone and Telegraph are not, appears on its face
rather absurd. Surely the influence wielded by one of these corporate behemoths over the
lives and fortunes of its employees is at least as great as the impact of most state and local
governments on the daily affairs of their citizens.
Stevenson, supra note 85, at 732.
179. Stevenson, supra note 85, at 729. Cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809
(1978) (White, J., dissenting) (“It has long been recognized however, that the special status of
corporations has placed them in a position to control vast amounts of economic power which may, if not
regulated, dominate not only the economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral
process.”).
180. Berle, supra note 163, at 658.
181. REICH, supra note 29, at 30.
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offensive weapon against government regulation and in the service of
managerial capitalism.182
By contrast, individuals might be better off with a jurisprudence
that asks whether corporate actions pass constitutional muster. As
Berle forcefully notes:
It is here submitted that a corporation or concentrate of
corporations, so situated that it has power seriously to affect the
individual life of a patron or customer, has become an arm of the
state so that its actions are reviewable to determine whether or
not they accord with the constitutional limitations and
183
requirements imposed on states.

The great irony here is that constitutional law might do what business
law has not done well: regulate corporations in a manner that
enhances public welfare.184 While there is at least some doctrinal
support to rethink the state action doctrine,185 such reform is
admittedly a very long haul. The crucial insight is to recognize that
corporations may more closely be analogized to governments than to
persons; after all, “[h]ad jurists focused on economic power, the
analogy of a corporation to a government might have forcefully
suggested itself.”186
182. See supra Part II.A.
183. Berle, supra note 163, at 657. Reich makes a similar argument:
The Constitution and the Bill of Rights should be made applicable to economic or private
government and to the workplace. Corporations should lose their special status as
“persons” and their ability to dominate the political process and the channels of
communication . . . . These changes would recognize the need to bring private economic
power under the Constitution and thus ultimately under the control of the American
people.
REICH, supra note 29, at 195.
184. As Reich laments, “Every form of legal control over the corporation has failed. Control by the
stockholders—the supposed owners of corporations—was lost to management. . . . A second kind of
legal control—the antitrust laws—also failed.” REICH, supra note 29, at 34–35.
185. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (“[T]he circumstance that the property
rights to the premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others
than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State’s permitting a corporation to govern a community of
citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties.”). Cf. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 184 (1961)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“A license to establish a restaurant is a license to establish a public facility
and necessarily imports, in law, equality of use for all members of the public.”).
186. Mark, supra note 19, at 1446; see also Bezanson, supra note 26, at 656 (“Indeed, the size and
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Specific reforms can follow. For instance, Erwin Chemerinsky has
suggested that “states could be required in chartering corporations or
granting licenses to insist that the private entity refrain from
infringing constitutional liberties”187 and Russell Stevenson envisions
a “Corporate Bill of Responsibilities”188 which would “at a
minimum, comprehend some guarantee of free speech, a prohibition
of invasions of individual privacy, and something akin to ‘due
process’ rights for employees and perhaps others.”189
Beyond suggestions for reform that should be debated, one should
not lose sight of the big picture. When thinking about whether our
jurisprudence has been evolving in precisely the wrong direction, it
might be worth revisiting Victor Brudney’s prescient warning thirty
years ago:
Regardless of whether increased corporate participation in the
social and political life of the nation is desirable as a matter of
policy, serious doubts exist regarding the validity of the
constitutional support thus given to that movement. That support
could significantly reduce the regulatory power of government
over an institution whose existence is uniquely a function of
government authorization, whose power and wealth often far
exceed those of the government that created it, and that has long
190
been a subject of pervasive government regulation.

To the extent that the issues raised by thinkers as varied as Reich,
Berle and Brudney are cause for concern, it might behoove us to
power of corporations would more likely lead to the conclusion that corporations are a sector in need of
popular control rather than in need of actively participating in political discourse.”).
187. Chemerinsky, supra note 177, at 527.
188. Stevenson, supra note 85, at 732. Much like Reich, Stevenson recognizes:
[T]he corporation as an institution possessing the power to intrude on important social
values, inherent in such a document, would explode the myth with which we have so long
been saddled that our society is sufficiently atomistic that the only concentration of
political and social power against which we must be on our guard is that which resides in
the state.
Id. at 733 (footnote omitted).
189. Id.
190. Brudney, supra note 126, at 236 (emphasis added).
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begin asking not whether corporations should have constitutional
rights, but whether to evolve a mechanism that protects individual
rights in the face of corporate power.191
CONCLUSION
One might reasonably argue that conceptualizing corporations is
not trivial. After all, “the large corporation [does] not fit well into a
legal system designed to mediate conflicts between individuals and
between individuals and government.”192 Notwithstanding this
reality, offering constitutional protections to corporations is nothing
short of breathtaking. As Carl Mayer observes:
Behind doctrines of commercial property and the free market
of ideas is hidden the tacit acceptance of the corporation as a
person, entitled to all the rights of real humans. Under this
methodology of constitutional operationalism, the rationale for
equating corporations and persons is not stated specifically,
however, so it cannot be rebutted. There is no opportunity for
denial; sub silentio the corporation is legitimated as a
193
constitutional actor.

Especially troubling is the fact that legitimization has occurred
without a consistent theory of the corporation.194
191. Cf. REICH, supra note 29, at 196 (“We must revise the social contract to reflect the central role of
organized economic power and to define the responsibilities that accompany such power.”).
192. Mark, supra note 19, at 1445; see also Krannich, supra note 21, at 89–90 (“The history of
corporate personality doctrine reflects a struggle to fit the corporate entity into traditional legal
practices. This is no easy task, for corporations do not readily fit within the American legal tradition.”);
Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra note 72, at 1641 (“As common as its presence may
be, the legal nature of the corporate person has defied simple analysis.”).
193. Mayer, supra note 12, at 650 (emphasis added). Cf. Bezanson, supra note 66, at 739
(“Institutional speech, in contrast, is abstracted from the individual; it is an artifact. It has nothing to do
with liberty and no necessary relationship to freedom, a term that is meaningless outside the context of
individuals.”).
194. See Mayer, supra note 12, at 650–51 (“But it is certain that the conferral of corporate Bill of
Rights protections, without any theory, has served an important legitimizing function. Extending these
rights has legitimized corporations as constitutional actors and placed them on a level with humans in
terms of Bill of Rights safeguards.”).
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One also cannot help but wonder to what extent a zero-sum game
is at work: greater constitutional protections for corporations come at
the expense of individual rights. As one commentator observes, one
must recognize “not only that legal personhood relates to actual
social status, but also that status may operate as a zero-sum game;
grants of legal personality to corporations may cheapen the social
meaning of humans’ legal personality”195—after all, “[c]alling
corporations persons sends a message about the state’s values: by
implicitly extending human dignity to artificial business entities, the
state cheapens the distinctiveness of legal personhood by
overextending its application.”196 As just one example, one might ask
whether over-expansive First Amendment rights for corporations
might trammel the due process rights of voters under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, or perhaps even the rights of shareholders
to remain silent under the First Amendment.197
Sadly, “[t]he corporation’s invocation of the first ten amendments
symbolizes the transformation of our constitutional system from one
of individual freedoms to one of organizational prerogatives.”198 By
contrast, reviving the artificial entity theory might return us to what
scholars such as Morton Horwitz have described as “‘methodological
individualism,’ that is, the view that the only real starting point for
195. Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1764.
196. Id. at 1765; see also Padfield, supra note 116, at 707 (“[T]here can be little doubt that the power
of multinational corporations is growing. It seems reasonable to conclude that this gain in power must
come at the expense of a loss of power on the part of other parties.”); Rivard, supra note 12, at 1431
(“One problem noted by commentators is the increasing protection corporations enjoy under the Bill of
Rights, which expands the power of corporations at the expense of individuals.”).
197. See also Mayer, supra note 12, at 658 (“Fourth [A]mendment rights applied to the corporation
diminish the individual’s right to live in an unpolluted world or to enjoy privacy. The corporate exercise
of first amendment rights frustrates the individual’s right to participate equally in democratic elections,
to pay reasonable utility rates, and to live in a toxin-free environment.”). In the words of one scholar:
When Mobil Oil Corporation purchases an advertisement that promotes a particular
social view, the real speaker is again top management. Should not Congress have the
power to deny top management access to the corporate treasury based on an equalfooting rationale? Management could spend its own personal funds or solicit, individually
or collectively, contributions from others to further their expression. This congressional
action would not prevent the actual expression, but would only place all individuals at the
same starting point.
O’Kelley, supra note 26, at 1382.
198. Mayer, supra note 12, at 578. Cf. Alvarez, supra note 157, at 35 (“We should never confuse the
economic rights of corporations (or of investors) for the rights of natural persons to live in dignity.”).
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political or legal theory is the individual.”199 Perhaps what is needed,
as some have suggested, is a constitutional amendment that
corporations, as creatures of the legislature, only enjoy rights
conferred to them by their creator.200 The broader point, however, is
that “[t]he State need not permit its own creation to consume it.”201
Amid all this pessimism, let me conclude on a hopeful note:
institutions such as corporations can only survive and thrive if we as
a polity validate them.202 Let us not forget that while “[m]onarchies
may legitimize themselves by reference to the divine right of
kings . . . in a society founded on democratic values legitimacy
ultimately depends on responsibility and accountability.”203 If more
of us stop acquiescing and begin asking for “responsibility and
accountability,” then perhaps one day our constitutional
jurisprudence will again be different.204 We need more people like
the brave child in Hans-Christian Andersen’s strikingly
contemporary tale about the naked emperor.

199. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 181. Cf. REICH, supra note 29, at 199–200 (“We need to restore
citizenship by returning to the ideal of democratic individualism . . . . In a society where organization
possesses so much power to change individual behavior, individuals must be much more conscious of
their species and evolutionary role, so that we can guide our own changes rather than submit to being
changed by impersonal forces.”).
200. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 12, at 660 (“What is required is a constitutional presumption
favoring the individual over the corporation. To establish this presumption, a constitutional amendment
is needed that declares corporations are not persons and that they are only entitled to statutory protection
conferred by legislatures and referendums.”).
201. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); see also
C.F. Adams, Jr., A Chapter of Erie, in CHAPTERS OF ERIE AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 95–96 (1871)
(“Modern society has created a class of artificial beings who bid fair soon to be the masters of their
creator.”); Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra note 72, at 1658 (“Loosen the fiction
theory from its absolutist moorings and we find a bare, political message: society should not lose control
over that which it creates.”).
202. See Backer, supra note 153, at 45 (“A corporation cannot exist as a viable entity in the absence
of either legal or social ‘validation.’”).
203. Stevenson, supra note 85, at 714.
204. Cf. Backer, supra note 153, at 1 (“It was once a comfortable tenet of law that economic
enterprises organized in[ ]corporate form were the creatures of the states that recognized and regulated
their existence.”).
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